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THE AMBIGUOUS BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECURITIES MARKETS
Joseph A. Grundfestt
INTRODUCTION
Read literally, United States securities laws draw a sharp dis-
tinction between securities that are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and all other financial instruments.
Only registered securities can be bought and sold by retail investors in
major markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. It
might thus seem that if a security is not registered with the SEC, the
financial risks and rewards associated with its ownership are inacces-
sible to United States retail investors who must trade in the public
markets. Read literally, United States securities laws also seem to
impose significant constraints on an issuer's ability to conduct private
placements in close temporal proximity to public offerings, or to cre-
ate private instruments with pricing features that render them overly
"fungible" with publicly traded instruments.
Appearances can be deceiving. The universe of securities not
registered with the SEC includes a huge array of instruments that are
issued by foreign entities. It also contains many billions of dollars
worth of instruments that are privately placed within the United States
by domestic and foreign issuers alike. Through a variety of market
innovations, all of which are entirely legal, even the least sophisti-
cated United States market participant is today able ta obtain financial
exposure to many foreign and domestic financial instruments that
cannot be directly sold to or traded among these same retail investors.
Moreover, the private placement market is rife with privately placed
instruments that are placed contemporaneously with public offerings,
or that have pricing features that render them, from a financial per-
spective, highly "fungible" with publicly traded instruments.
t William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Commis-
sioner, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (1985-1990).
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-Much of this flexibility has evolved because of responsible,
pragmatic regulation by the SEC and its staff, combined with vibrant
innovation in the capital markets. The result is a situation in which
the bright-line distinction between registered and unregistered securi-
ties is often (but not always) reduced to a pricing and marketing tech-
nicality. The sharp distinction between registered and unregistered
instruments that exists in the law is thus often far less discernable in
the real world.
This presentation suggests that the SEC and students of securi-
ties markets should recognize this reality of modem capital markets.
Policy makers need not cleave so closely to the formalistic notion that
there is a bright-line distinction between registered public offerings
on the one hand and unregistered private placements and offshore
instruments on the other. The Commission should therefore aggres-
sively pursue a functional approach and only impose registration costs
on the capital formation process when, consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina, there is reason to believe
that investors who cannot otherwise "fend for themselves" will effi-
ciently benefit from the imposition of registration requirements.' As
an example of an appropriate liberalization that would not reduce in-
vestor safeguards one whit, the Commission could, as explained be-
low, relax some of the limitations inherent in the Squadron Ellenoff2
and Black Box3 no-action letters. It could also clarify that it is per-
missible for private placement issuers to rely on pricing and offering
mechanisms that are contingent on subsequent public offerings.
Part I of this very brief presentation provides a capsule summary
of the registration requirement of the Securities Act of 1933. 4 Part II
describes a sample of instruments and transactions that are entirely
legal but that have economic consequences functionally equivalent to
the offering of unregistered securities to retail investors, or to the
commingling of public and private offerings. The samples described
in Part II do not purport to constitute a complete description of this
market. Part III concludes with some pragmatic observations about
the implications of current market realities for the evolution of public
policy in this area. It suggests that doctrinal precision can and should
responsibly take a back seat to market reality and to the efficient pro-
tection of investors who, as the Supreme Court put it, cannot "fend
for themselves" in these transactions.
' SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). For a similar recent view ex-
pressed by another former Commissioner of the SEC, see Roberta S. Karmel, Integration of
Public and Private Offerings, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 19, 2001, at 3.
2 Squadron, Ellenoff, Pleasant & Lehrer, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 363 (Feb. 28, 1992).
3 Black Box Inc., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 926 (June 26, 1990).
4 For a more detailed discussion, see generally 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
LAW HANDBOOK 57-684 (2001).
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I. THE BRIGHT LINE SEPARATING REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES
The black letter law regarding the sale and resale of securities in
the United States is straightforward. All sales or resales of securities
must be registered with the SEC, unless the transaction or security is
expressly exempt. The person claiming the benefit of the exemption
bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the exemption is avail-
able. The statute provides for several significant exemptions to this
remarkably broad registration requirement. Indeed, modem capital
markets are able to function in a liquid form only because of the
sweep of these exemptions.
From an issuer's perspective, the most important exemption is
the private placement provision of section 4(2). In SEC v. Ralston
Purina,5 the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the private
placement exemption is to exempt transactions involving sales to per-
sons who, because of their lack of access to information about issuers,
or because of their inability to protect their own financial interests,
cannot "fend for themselves." 6 The Court expressly observed that
there is no quantitative limit to the number of investors who may par-
ticipate in such an offering or on the dollar value of the securities that
could be sold in such a private placement-again, provided that the
investors in the transaction can fend for themselves.
The SEC provided greater regulatory precision to this exemption
when it adopted rule 506 of Regulation D Rule 506 permits a pri-
vate placement of an unlimited dollar value of unregistered securities
to an unlimited number of "accredited" investors and to no more than
thirty-five unaccredited investors.8  Accredited investors can be
loosely defined as individuals with net worth in excess of one million
dollars, without regard to their financial sophistication or ability to
fend for themselves.9 Unaccredited investors who are permitted to
participate in these rule 506 private placements must, however, be
able to fend for themselves either independently or with the assistance
of a "purchaser representative." 10
If an offering does not qualify as a proper private placement, if
no other exemption is available, and if the offering has not been reg-
istered, then dire consequences can follow. In particular, the pur-
chaser of an unregistered security has the right to return the security
to the seller for the initial purchase price even if there has been no
5 346 U.S. 119.
6 Id. at 125.
7 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2000).
" See id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
9 See id. § 230.501(a)(5).
'0 See iL § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); id. § 230.501(h).
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material misrepresentation or omission in the offering process." This
rescission right is equivalent to offering a put option to the purchaser
where the option gives the purchaser a one-year money-back guaran-
tee in the event that the security's price declines, even if through no
fault of the seller's. This potential rescission right creates contingent
liabilities that can adversely impair an issuer's financial statements. It
also can cause difficult disclosure issues in connection with a public
offering of the issuer's securities.
12
To this point, the statutory and regulatory design seems clear.
On one side of a great divide stand registered securities that can be
sold to investors who are unable to fend for themselves and who are
not millionaires. These investments can be freely traded in liquid,
open markets such as the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. On
the other side stand unregistered instruments that can safely be of-
fered only to those who can fend for themselves or who are million-
aires. If an issuer errs and fails to register an offering when no ex-
emption is available it can be subject to significant liability.
II. THE REALITIES OF THE MARKETPLACE
The reality of the marketplace is, however, very different from a
world that assiduously reflects this bright-line distinction. The United
States's public securities markets are chock-a-block full of financial
instruments that permit small, unsophisticated investors to participate
in the economic risks and returns generated by unregistered securities.
Recent market transactions also allow issuers in private placements to
engage in contemporaneous or temporally contiguous public offer-
ings, or to receive private placement valuations that reflect subse-
quent initial public offerings. The markets thus readily commingle
publicly available registered-security risk with non-registered risk.
Significantly, the ease with which the markets currently leap the
barrier between registered and unregistered instruments raises no
practical material investor protection concern of which I am aware.
To illustrate, consider the four following examples of instruments and
transactions that jump the registered/unregistered boundary, all with
beneficial effect: (1) the offering of unregistered offshore equity risk
through actively managed mutual funds and other collective invest-
ment vehicles; (2) the recent emergence of private placements with
valuations that are contingent on the pricing of a future initial public
offering; (3) the evolution of PIPEs transactions (private investments
in public equities); and (4) the Black Box and Squadron Ellenoff let-
" See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994). See also
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, at 2-19.
12 See B'LOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, at 90-91.
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ters, particularly viewed in conjunction with the market conditions
that recently caused the SEC to adopt rule 155.13
A. Mutual Funds and Collective Investment Vehicles
Mutual funds and other collective investment vehicles, such as
insurance policies and defined benefit retirement funds, probably con-
stitute the largest mechanism through which retail investors are able
to invest indirectly in securities that are not registered with the SEC.
To illustrate, consider the fact that there are a large number of ac-
tively managed mutual funds registered with the SEC that claim to
have international investment objectives and that invest many billions
of dollars in securities traded only on offshore markets. Each of these
funds invests the lion's share of its portfolio in foreign markets where
issuers have not registered their shares with the SEC and where those
issuers do not comply with United States Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles. Thus, investors who purchase any of these mu-
tual funds acquire exposure to a portfolio of individual securities,
none of which could be sold directly to them. Similarly, holders of
insurance policies issued by insurers engaged in international invest-
ing and pensioners whose pension funds are invested abroad also ac-
quire exposure to unregistered foreign security risk that they could
not directly acquire in United States markets.
This situation is not a cause for alarm, and there have been no
suggestions of material harm or wrongdoing as a result of this market
process. Indeed, this situation is easily reconciled with some of the
technical requirements of Regulation D. In particular, rule 506 of
Regulation D provides that unaccredited investors are able to pur-
chase in private placements if they themselves, or together with a
purchaser representative, are "capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investnient. ' '14 Viewed from this perspective,
a mutual fund manager, insurance company portfolio manager, or
pension fund investment fiduciary fulfills the role of "purchaser rep-
resentative" for the retail investor. The public trading of unregistered
securities so facilitated through the mechanism of a collective invest-
ment vehicles is therefore entirely consistent with the logic of the
SEC's own private placement regulations under rule 506, once we
appreciate that the professional fund manager is a functional equiva-
lent of the Regulation D "purchaser representative."
B. Private Placements That Reflect Public Market Values
Another intriguing development that blurs the distinction be-
tween public offerings and private placements is the emergence of
'" See 17 C.F.R. § 230.155.
14 Id. § 230.506(h)(2)(ii).
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private placements that are offered at prices contingent upon public
offerings that have not occurred as of the date of the private place-
ment, and as to which no public offering can even be guaranteed to
occur. Consider, for example, the private placement on October 20,
2000, of $75 million of 514% convertible subordinated notes due 2005
issued by Mayan Networks Corporation. 15 The conversion price of
the notes was initially set at $38.12 per share, subject to reduction
according to the following schedule:
(i) if a Complying Public Equity Offering ("CPEO") 16
occurs prior to November 1, 2001, then the conver-
sion price is reset to the public offering price, if that
price is lower than the conversion price;
(ii) if the CPEO occurs prior to November 1, 2002, but
on or after November 1, 2001, then the conversion
price is reset to the lesser of 90% of the public of-
fering price, or 90% of the conversion price;
(iii) if the CPEO occurs prior to November 1, 2003, but
on or after November 1, 2002, then the conversion
price is reset to the lesser of 80% of the public of-
fering price, or 80% of the conversion price; and
(iv) if the CPEO has not occurred prior to November 1,
2003, then the conversion price is reduced to 35% of
the otherwise applicable conversion price. 17
Therefore, in the event Mayan is able to complete a qualifying
public offering prior to November 1, 2003, the purchasers of these
notes will be guaranteed a right to acquire IPO exposure at the IPO
price or lower. Given that this instrument was structured at a time
when the IPO market for optical telecommunication companies, such
as Mayan, was still "hot," and given that there was then an expecta-
tion of a price "pop" in the immediate aftermarket, these privately
placed securities provided Mayan with an opportunity to raise capital
by pre-selling a potentially "hot" IPO that had not yet occurred.
From the purchaser's perspective, the offering was also poten-
tially attractive because it afforded a potentially large number of ac-
quirers, otherwise unable purchase in the IPO, an opportunity to ac-
quire at a price no worse than the subsequent offering price. Thus,
rather than be forced to purchase at a premium to the IPO price in the
aftermarket, purchasers of these privately placed securities acquired
15 Mayan Networks Corp., Confidential Offering Circular (Oct. 20, 2000) (not formally
published manuscript, on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).16 A CPEO is defined as "[t]he first firm commitment underwritten public offering of
common stock of Mayan Networks in which Mayan Networks shall have raised at least
$50,000,000 in gross proceeds from the offering." Id. at 57.
17 See id. at 6.
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an opportunity to purchase at a discount to the IPO price in the pre-
IPO market. Moreover, because the conversion price declined over
time, the notes were structured so as to provide Mayan with an incen-
tive to complete a public offering as quickly as possible-an objec-
tive consistent with the goals of purchasers who want to hold Ma-
yan's common stock, not its subordinated notes.
But what of the federal securities law concern that these private
placed securities constitute a de facto offering at a price that is con-
tingent upon a public offering as to which no registration statement
had yet been filed with the SEC? Whatever metaphysical issues
might have been raised by this observation, they should (and in fact
did) have no practical impact on the offering process because all the
purchasers in this offering were able to fend for themselves quite
nicely. Indeed, because the offering was structured to comply with
rule 144A, 18 the entire offering was initially purchased by the under-
writer, a sophisticated broker-dealer with substantial knowledge of
the issuer's business.' 9 Subsequent resales were restricted to "quali-
fied institutional buyers," who, pursuant to rule 144A, must in general
hold securities portfolios of $100 million or more.20 Thus, everyone
contemplated to be in the chain of ownership would be a sophisti-
cated, well-financed investor who would not need the protection of
the registration process. The transmutation of public offering pricing
risk to the private placement market here does not, as a matter of
policy, raise any of the issues implicated by the Securities Act of
1933.
C. PIPEs Transactions
A PIPEs transaction describes a "private investment in public
equities"-in other words, a private placement of equity securities by
issuers who already have a class of publicly issued and registered
shares.2 ' Historically, these transactions were most commonly used
by biotech issuers or other technology firms with significant demands
for additional capital but with market capitalizations too small to
comfortably allow for follow-on offerings large enough to provide the
needed capital.
More recently, however, large leveraged buyout firms began
purchasing PIPEs. These private placement transactions are uncon-
iS 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
19 Mayan Network Corp., supra note 15, at 83.
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (a)(1)(5). See also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, at 538-41.
21 See, e.g., Erica Copulsky, Novel Solutions: Cash-Rich LBO Firms Are Being Forced to
Go Outside the Box to Find New Ways to Put All Their Money to Use, INVESTMENT DEALERS'
DIG., Mar. 22, 1999, at 22; John LeClaire & Kevin Dennis, Going Private-Private Equity
Investors Discover Public Market Orphans, VENTURE CAP. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at 44; Debra
Sparks, Return of the LBO, Bus. WY., Oct. 16, 2000, at 130.
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troversial, in my view, from a securities law perspective. The pur-
chasers are highly sophisticated organizations with a well-established
ability to fend for themselves. The controversy generated by these
instruments results instead from the poor aftermarket performance of
some of these transactions-particularly in the telecommunications
sector 22-combined with the fact that investors in LBO funds pay
20% overrides, and that many investors expect that their funds will be
put to work in classic LBO-style active restructurings rather than
more passive PIPEs-style transactions.
D. SEC No-Action Letters and Rule 155
Securities law concerns also arise when an issuer seeks to con-
duct a private placement (a) while it is in registration for an IPO, (b)
just before the filing of a registration statement, or (c) just after the
23
withdrawal of a registration statement. In the Black Box and
Squadron Ellenoff no-action letters, the staff provided comfort to
some issuers engaged in concurrent private placements and public
offerings. These no action letters, however, specifically describe cir-
cumstances involving a limited number of appropriate investors, such
as (a) 35 or fewer purchasers, consisting of QIBs (qualified institu-
tional buyers) and no more than three institutional investors who are
not QIBs, or (b) no more than four purchasers, all of whom are non-
QIB institutional investors, plus up to three additional non-QIB insti-
tutional investors who are pre-existing security holders of the issuer.
From a policy perspective, it is legitimate to ask whether these
restrictions are entirely necessary. If all participants in a transaction
are sufficiently capable of fending for themselves, then what legiti-
mate purpose related to the function of the registration requirements
is served by the numerical limitations inherent in the Black Box and
Squadron Ellenoff letters?
The SEC's recent adoption of rule 15524 can be similarly de-
scribed as a welcome liberalization that may not reach as far as it
could or should. The rule provides for safe harbors from integration
concerns in the case of (a) registered offerings following abandoned
private placements, and (b) private placements following abandoned
public offerings.
As the SEC explained in the rule 155 adopting release, rapid
changes in market conditions can cause issuers to decide to terminate
private placements and then, very quickly, to pursue a public offer-
22 See, e.g., Sparks, supra note 21, at 130 (citing losses by LBO fund Hicks Muse in a
PIPEs offering by ICG Communications at $29 per share that subsequently traded down to
$0.50 per share).
23 See, e.g., BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, at 481-93.
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.155.
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ing.25 Market conditions can also cause an issuer to pursue a private
placement almost immediately upon the withdrawal of a registration
statement. In both cases, rule 155 requires a thirty-day "cooling off"
period between the private placement and the public offering. The
goal of the cooling-off period is to assure a "clean break" between the
public and private phases of the offering. In both cases, however, if
all the investors in the private placement are able to fend for them-
selves, then the thirty-day cooling-off period would seem to be a for-
mality that serves no functional purpose under the Securities Act.
Indeed, the thirty-day waiting periods contemplated by rule 155 can
then only raise the cost of capital formation without enhancing in-
vestor protection.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The policy implications of this analysis are clear. The capital
markets have already generated a broad array of techniques that can
be used by retail investors in the public markets to obtain access to
the risks and returns reflected in foreign and domestic securities that
have not complied with United States registration, accounting, or dis-
closure requirements. In the professional market, a broad array of
techniques allow sophisticated investors to engage in private market
transactions that are financially commingled with publicly registered
risks and returns, but that technically constitute distinct securities.
Because the capital markets readily generate substitutes in the
public markets for private market risk, and in the private markets for
public market risk, the SEC is well advised not to elevate form over
substance. It should instead focus its regulatory efforts on measures
that efficiently protect investors who cannot otherwise fend for them-
selves. In particular, unnecessarily aggressive interpretations of the
integration doctrine can add to transactions costs without otherwise
contributing to investor protection. This danger arises most appar-
ently when cooling-off periods are imposed to protect private place-
ment investors who can fend for themselves and where the cooling-
off period can only increase capital formation costs. The capital for-
mation process need not be so complex, and the time is ripe for prag-
matic simplification of a doctrine that purports in theory to segregate
public from private markets but in practice only makes life more
complicated and expensive for all involved.26
Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7943, 2001 SEC
LEXIS 166 (Jan. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.155).
2 See also Karmel, supra note 1, at 7 ('The regulatory morass that Section 5 compliance
has become is a cost of capital raising that merits thorough reexamination and simplification.").
2001]

